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The history of the United States is peppered with moments when governmental vindictiveness 
(that bogeyman of the Ex Post Facto Clause) targeted at particular groups was particularly 
tempting, and the country's record in resisting these pressures is spotty. When society recognizes 
a virulent present epidemic, there may be an urge to administer the required medicine to all 
those who have ever harbored, even putatively, the infection.1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Jeff, a Nebraska resident, was convicted of possession of child pornography in 1997.  He 
describes this period in his life as a distant memory and claims he has “completely turned [his] 
life around.”  Jeff served jail time and successfully completed ten years of probation. After eval-
uations, doctors now consider him a low risk to reoffend.  Jeff lived in anonymity until Nebras-
ka’s sex offender laws changed on January 4, 2010.  While the previous law made public only 
information about those offenders considered a “high risk” to reoffend, the new law requires in-
formation about all convicted sex offenders, including photo and address, to be placed online.   
 It did not take long for people to notice. “I have a friendly neighbor . . . and she calls me 
up and says people are passing your picture around the neighborhood, ” Jeff explains.  One night 
after the change in the law, Jeff came home to find threatening notes taped to his front door— 
the message was “move or suffer.” “A couple of other ones were really vulgar, talking about 
what people would like to do to me, removing body parts,” Jeff says.   Others harassed his teen-
age children, “there's my picture [from] the Internet with a message that's too vulgar to say on 
TV of what this person wants to do to me because I'm a pedophile in their mind and it's taped to 
my son's truck."2    
 Similarly, Ms. Whitaker, a Georgian resident, was convicted of performing oral sex on a 
minor in 1996.  She was seventeen years old and her high school classmate was three weeks shy 
                                                
1 Constitutional Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 268, 276-77 (2003).   
2  Unjust and Ineffective, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/14164614. 
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of his fifteenth birthday.  In 1996, Georgia referred to oral sex as “sodomy” in the penal code.3  
She finished her probation in 2002.  However, as Georgia places sex offenders on a public regis-
try, Ms Whitaker’s name, photograph, and address are easily accessible via an online database, 
along with the information that she was convicted of “sodomy.”  Her name appears on a list de-
scribed as containing those who have “been convicted of a criminal offence against a victim who 
is a minor or any dangerous sexual offence.”  She “sees people whispering, and parents pulling 
their children indoors when she walks by.”  In Georgia, registered sex offenders are barred from 
living within 1,000 feet of anywhere children congregate.  As the church at the end of her street 
provides child-care, Ms. Whitaker was evicted from her home.  A local news spot on sex of-
fenders featured her, showing a map of her location and listing her as being convicted of sodomy.   
 Ms. Whitaker remains on the sex offender registry although, in fact, what she did is no 
longer a sex crime in Georgia.  The states sodomy laws were stuck down in 1998 and 2002.  In 
2006, Romeo and Juliet laws changed the classification of her offense.  However, these new laws, 
unlike the sex offender registry, are not retroactive and Ms. Whitaker continues to suffer stigma-
tism and harassment.4  
 The aforementioned laws are a result of a public outrage against sex offenders.  Begin-
ning with a rash of child sex abuse cases in the 1980’s and 90’s, including the abduction and 
murder of Adam Walsh, a six-year-old boy who was taken from a Sears department store in 1981, 
the public has demanded more stringent laws in an effort to keep prior sex offenders from 
reoffending.  These laws have increased in severity over time, requiring registration for addition-
al offenses and mandating public notification. The most recent federal legislation is the Sex Of-
fender Registration and Notification Act of 2006 (also known as Title I of the Adam Walsh Child 
                                                
3 In 1996, Georgia law prohibited oral sex even as between married couples.  Id.  
4  Unjust and Ineffective, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/14164614. 
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Protection and Safety Act of 2006, hereinafter referred to as “SORNA”).  SORNA encourages 
states to set up their own online registries by tying a portion of federal funding to their creation.    
 The news cycle continues in 2012, from Jerry Sandusky’s court hearings to the Mira-
mount School district, which fired its entire staff after two teachers were accused of sex crimes, 
sex offenders continue to be the focus of community outrage.  Currently, all fifty states have 
online sex offender registries.  Some refer to our sex offender laws as the “strictest of any rich 
democracy.”5  In 2009, 674,000 individuals were on sex offender registries, more than the popu-
lation of Vermont, Wyoming, or North Dakota.6 
 The goal of preventing vindictive legislation aimed at unpopular groups surfaced in the 
very first case to consider the Ex Post Facto Clause.  In Calder v. Bull, Justice Chase, speaking 
on the history of ex post facto laws, stated, “[w]ith very few exceptions, the advocates of [ex post 
facto] laws were stimulated by ambition, or personal resentment, and vindictive malice. To pre-
vent such, and similar, acts of violence and injustice, I believe, the Federal and State Legisla-
tures, were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder; or any Ex Post Facto law.”7  Protection 
of unpopular groups, along with providing adequate notice, create the twin aims of the Clause.   
 However, in cases presenting Ex Post Facto challenges to SORNA and the promulgation 
of state laws under SORNA, courts have been silent with regard to these historical aims.8  The 
increasing deference to legislative intent, along with the absence the foundational guiding princi-
                                                
5  America’s unjust sex laws, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/14165460?story_id=14165460 
6 Id.  
7 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 389, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798). 
8 In 2012, in United States v. Reynolds, 132 S.Ct. 975 (2012) the Supreme Court held that SORNA, on its 
face, does not apply to pre-SORNA sex offenders who were not already otherwise required to register until the 
Attorney General promulgates a rule to the contrary.  The Court remanded the case back to the Third Circuit to 
determine if the rule promulgated to this effect by the Attorney General in 2007 is valid.  Therefore, since federal Ex 
Post Facto challenges only look to the face of the statute when making their determination, SORNA does not 
implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause, even though it continues to be applied retroactively according to the Attorney 
General’s rule.  However, this does not alleviate concerns about the changing Ex Post Facto analysis, or retroactive 
state laws promulgated under SORNA.    
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ples of the clause, makes it impossible for advocates to show even the most severe SORNA-like 
legislation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.   
 This note examines the constitutionality of the retroactive application of state laws prom-
ulgated under the federal framework.   This note argues the courts’ Ex Post Facto analysis of sex 
offender registration laws is flawed in two ways.  First, when courts analyze sex offender regis-
tration laws under the Ex Post Facto Clause absent the historical aims, the multifactor test is per-
formed in a vacuum, void of guidance, and becomes extremely subjective.  This allows the out-
come to be determined by the composition of the court and allows courts to be swayed by public 
opinion, precisely what the Ex Post Facto Clause was intended to protect unpopular groups from.  
Second, the courts’ increased deference to the states’ ability to create civil regulatory laws has 
made it nearly impossible for advocates to show that a “civil” law has a “criminal” purpose or 
effect.  This enables states to circumvent an Ex Post Facto violation by labeling their laws “civil.”  
This paper will also examine possible future influence as well as suggested solutions.   
 Part I will give a brief background of the Ex Post Facto Clause analysis, SORNA, and 
subsequent state sex offender registration laws.  Part II will examine the “new” Ex Post Facto 
analysis under Smith v. Doe and other court holdings.9  Part III will discuss what this new analy-
sis could mean, including discussion of how states can avoid constitutional challenges and possi-
ble future legislation.  Finally, Part IV will look at potential solutions.   
                                                
9 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).   
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I.  HISTORY OF THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE & SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES 
A.  The Ex Post Facto Clause   
 The ‘Ex Post Facto Clause’ states, “[n]o state shall . . . pass any . . . Ex Post Facto law.”10  
The clause only applies to criminal sanctions and “assures that citizens are on notice of criminal 
statutes so that they can conform their conduct to the requirements of existing laws.”11  As 
Blackstone stated, “it is impossible that the party could foresee that an action, innocent when it 
was done, should be afterwards converted to guilt by a subsequent law; he had therefore no cause 
to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence be cruel and un-
just.”12  Thus, Ex Post Facto laws are unfair because they deprive individuals of notice of the 
wrongfulness of their behavior until after the fact.13  The Clause ensures that legislative acts 
“give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly 
changed.”14 Such notice is vital in the context of criminal law where deprivations are greatest.15  
 The Supreme Court’s first interpretation of the Ex Post Facto Clause was in Calder v. 
Bull.16 Justice Chase described the specific categories encompassed within the clause as follows: 
1st. Every law that makes an action, done before the passing of the law, 
and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 
2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, 
when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts 
a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the punishment, than the 
                                                
10 U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 10, cl. 1.  For a fuller discussion on early Ex Post Facto jurisprudence and the 
history of the clause see Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1261 (1998).  “The Framers highlighted their profound concern over ex post facto lawmaking by also 
prohibiting ex post facto laws by Congress. Concern over retroactive legislation is evident elsewhere in Article I, 
which also prohibits bills of attainder in two different sections.” Id. at 1275 n.88.  See also U.S COST. ART. I, § 9, cl. 
3 (as to Congress); art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (as to States). 
11 J. Richard Broughton, On Straddle Crimes and the Ex Post Facto Clauses, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 719, 
721 (2011).   
12 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46.   
13 Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1261, 1276 (1998). 
14 Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981). 
15 Logan, supra note 13, at 1276.  “[F]air warning of that conduct that will give rise to criminal penalties is 
fundamental to our concept of constitutional liberty.” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191 (1977).   
16 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798). 
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law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the 
legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the 
law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to con-
vict the offender.17 
 
 In the past, the Supreme Court has focused on two major elements when deciding if a 
statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.  First, the Court is guided by the overall purpose of the 
clause.  Second, the Court looks to specific tests and factors developed over time.   
1.  Historical Purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause 
 As noted in prior commentary, there were few Ex Post Facto cases in the first two hun-
dred years after its enactment.18  However, when the Court did deal with Ex Post Facto Clause 
challenges, it identified two major purposes: “1) preventing ‘arbitrary and potentially vindictive 
legislation’” and 2) “providing notice to the general public that their actions have been criminal-
ized prior to prosecution.”19  
 The goal of preventing vindictive legislation surfaced in the first case to consider the Ex 
Post Facto Clause.  In Calder v. Bull, which contains the classic Supreme Court take on the 
clause, Justice Chase, speaking of the history of Ex Post Facto Laws, stated, “[w]ith very few 
exceptions, the advocates of [Ex Post Facto] laws were stimulated by ambition, or personal re-
sentment, and vindictive malice. To prevent such, and similar, acts of violence and injustice, I 
believe, the Federal and State Legislatures, were prohibited from passing any bill of attainder; or 
any Ex Post Facto law.”20  Additionally, in Miller v. Florida,21 the Court stated that the first his-
torical purpose of the Clause, as derived from Calder v. Bull22 was to “assure that federal and 
                                                
17 Calder, 3 U.S. 386, 390. 
18Corey Rayburn Yung, The Disappearing Ex Post Facto Clause: From Substantive Bulwark to Procedural 
Nuisance, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 447, 456 (2011).   
19 Id.  See also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981). 
20 Calder, 3 U.S. 386, 389. 
21 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987). 
22  Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). 
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state legislatures were restrained from enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislation . . . [and to] 
preventing legislative abuses.”23  
 The second historical purpose, also derived from Calder and other early sources, is to  
“‘give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly 
changed.’”24 This is essentially a notice requirement.25  The two historical purposes of the Clause 
have traditionally been discussed in Court cases as a foundation or a framework for the specific 
Ex Post Facto analysis.26      
2.  Ex Post Facto Factors and Test 
 Generally, the Ex Post Facto Clause prevents Federal or State legislatures from enacting 
any law “‘which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was 
committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.’”27  Therefore, the Court 
has stated that in order for a criminal law to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause it must “be retro-
spective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage 
the offender affected by it.”28   
 However, it is not always clear whether a law has criminal or civil implications.  The 
court employs a two-part test, what has been called the “intent-effects test,” in order to make this 
determination.29 According to this test, the court “must initially ascertain whether the legislature 
meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.”30  This inquiry determines whether the legisla-
                                                
23 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987).  
24 Id. (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28-29).   
25 Id.  
26 See, e.g., Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183 (1915); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S., at 229; 
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 138, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810) 
27 Weaver, 450 U.S. at 28 (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 325-326, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1867)). 
28 Id. at 29.   
29 “The categorization of a particular proceeding as civil or criminal ‘is first of all a question of statutory 
construction.’” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (quoting Allen, 478 U.S., at 368). 
30 Id. at 361.  
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ture either “expressly or impliedly” desired the statute to carry a criminal or a civil label.31  If a 
court determines that the legislature wanted the statute to carry a criminal label, then they need 
not proceed any further and all applicable Constitutional protections will apply.  If, however, the 
court finds that the legislature intended the regulation to be civil, it must then determine whether 
“the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] inten-
tion” to deem it “civil.”32 
 In order to make this determination, the court uses a multi-factor test, including: 
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has 
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a 
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of pun-
ishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is al-
ready a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be con-
nected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the al-
ternative purpose assigned.33 
 
Each factors is relevant to the inquiry, and as the Court noted they “may often point in differing 
directions.”34  In the past, the Court advised that no one factor is dispositive and that this may not 
be an exclusive list of considerations.35  Additionally, a court will only look at the face of the 
law, not its enforcement, to see if the Ex Post Facto Clause is implicated.  Finally, the Court stat-
ed that the legislature’s express or implied intent that the statute be civil in nature will be over-
come only by the “clearest proof” that the statute is actually punitive.36  However, as subsequent 
sections will describe, as the courts have dropped the twin historical aims, the multi factor test is 
left without a framework or foundation.  Additionally, the “clearest proof” has thus far been an 
impossible standard to meet in federal courts.   
                                                
31 Ward, 488 U.S. at 248.   
32 Id.  See also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). 
33 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).   
34 Id.  
35 Ward, 488 at 249 (stating that these factors are neither “exclusive nor dispositive”).  
36 Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.  
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B.  Federal and Sex Offender Registry Laws 
 The very first sex offender registries started in the states.  They became widespread in the 
1980’s and 1990’s.37  Public notification of sex offender release and whereabouts continued in 
1996 when the federal government adopted a version of ‘Megan’s Law.’38  SORNA, passed in 
2006, is the current federal registration scheme.39   
1.  History of State and Federal Sex Offender Legislation 
 In 1994 Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Vi-
olent Offender Registration Act (“Jacob Wetterling Act”).40  The Jacob Wetterling Act estab-
lished the first federal guidelines for states to track sex offenders, requiring annual or quarterly 
reporting if the sex offender was convicted of a violent crime.41 Additionally, during the 1990’s, 
every state and the District of Columbia passed what is commonly referred to as a ‘Megan’s 
Law.’42  This is short hand for a law that requires sex offenders to register with the state.  In Jan-
uary of 1996, Congress enacted a federal version of Megan’s Law that 1) provided for the public 
dissemination of information from individual states’ registries and 2) allowed information col-
lected under state registration schemes to be disclosed for any purpose permitted under a state 
law.43   
                                                
37 Legislative History, SMART, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/legislation.htm (last visited May 9, 2012).   
38 Id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id. Jacob Wetterling, after whom the act was named, was an eleven-year-old boy who was abducted at 
gunpoint in 1989 while cycling with two friends. See Jacobs Story, JACOB WETTERLING RESOURCE CENTER, 
http://www.jwrc.org (last visited May 9, 2012). 
41 Legislative History, SMART, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/legislation.htm (last visited May 9, 2012). 
42 Id. 
43 Legislative History, SMART, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/legislation.htm (last visited May 9, 2012). 
It is important to note that at this time, most states allow dissemination of all information collected via sex offender 
registries to be shared with the public “for any reason.” Also in 1996, Congress passed the Pam Lyncher Sex 
Offender Tracking and Identification Act.  This   required the “Attorney General to establish a national database (the 
National Sex Offender Registry or ‘NSOR’) by which the FBI could track certain sex offenders. The law also: 
Mandated certain sex offenders living in a state without a minimally sufficient sex offender registry program to 
register with the FBI. Required the FBI to periodically verify the addresses of the sex offenders to whom the Act 
pertains. Allowed for the dissemination of information collected by the FBI necessary to protect the public to 
federal, state and local officials responsible for law enforcement activities or for running background checks 
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 The Jacob Wetterling Act was amended in 1998 to allow victims’ rights’ advocates a 
greater impact on whether a sex offender was labeled “violent” for purposes of the Act.44  It also 
allowed states to require registration for offenses not listed in the Act and required the Bureau of 
Prisons to notify states when federal offenders were released or paroled.45   In 2000, Congress 
passed the Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act, which required any person who was otherwise 
required to register under state law to notify any higher education institution where the person 
worked or attended of his or her status as a sex offender.46  It also required those institutions to 
report this information to local law enforcement and to keep track of it as a part of their campus 
crime statistics. 47  This further restricted the movements of many offenders and also placed addi-
tional stigma on institutions that allowed them to attend.   
 Finally, in 2003 Congress passed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the 
Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act.48  This law required states to create and main-
tain a website with registry information, and created a federal website, run by the Department of 
Justice, with links to each state site.49  Overall, as a part of their ‘civil’ regulatory schemes, these 
statutes continued to add additional requirements to previously convicted sex offenders analo-
gous to those of a present criminal sentence.  For example, many reporting requirements, such as 
those mandating that an offender update his or her address, vehicle, and employment information 
                                                                                                                                                       
pursuant to the National Child Protection Act (42 U.S.C. §5119, et. seq.). Id.  The Act also “[s]et forth provisions 
relating to notification of the FBI and state agencies when a certain sex offender moved to another state.” Id.  Like 
the driving influence for the all of the previous legislation, Pam Lyncher was a victim of a sexual assault.  
http://www.jfa.net/lychner/Pam.html. She became a victims’ rights advocate when she was notified that the man 
who assaulted her was eligible for early release. Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 In 1998 Congress passed the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act.  This Act: “Directed the 
Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) to carry out the Sex Offender Management Assistance (SOMA) program to help 
eligible states comply with registration requirements” and “[p]rohibited federal funding to programs that gave 
federal prisoners access to the internet without supervision.” Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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on a quarterly basis, are analogous to those required for persons on probation or parole.50  Addi-
tionally, the websites are reminiscent of public shaming punishments used during colonial times.  
A website listing a persons name and mugshot under the heading of “Convicted Sex Offender” is 
not unlike the criminal punishment of placing a person in the stocks.    
2.  SORNA and Current State Requirements 
 In 2006, Congress passed The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.51  The Sex 
Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) is found in Title I.  SORNA makes the 
previous laws stronger in several ways.  First, it “expanded the number of sex offenses that must 
be captured by registration jurisdictions to include all State, Territory, Tribal, Federal, and 
UCMJ sex offense convictions, as well as certain foreign convictions.”52  SORNA also makes it 
a federal crime for sex-offenders to travel interstate without registering, and makes it a federal 
offense for sex offenders convicted under federal law to travel intrastate without registering.53  
Finally, it further encourages states to set up their own online registries by tying a certain portion 
of federal funding to website creation.54 
 In 2012, in United States v. Reynolds,55 the Supreme Court held that SORNA, on its face, 
does not apply to pre-SORNA sex offenders who were not already otherwise required to register 
until the Attorney General promulgates a rule to the contrary.  The Court remanded the case back 
                                                
50 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 90 (2003).   
51 As previously mentioned, this Act was named after Adam Walsh, a six-year-old boy who was abducted 
and murdered in 1981. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28257294/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/police-killing-
adam-walsh-solved/#.T3nP5hwv03U.  The story is recited often in the media, but is equally tragic with each telling.  
Fishermen found the boys head two weeks after the abduction, but his body was never found.  Id.  In response to this 
tragic event, John Walsh, Adam’s father, became a victims’ rights’ advocate. Id.  He is the host of America’s Most 
Wanted, and has written three books about his experience. Id.  The Adam Walsh Child Protection Act was signed by 
George W. Bush on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Adam’s disappearance.  Id.  SORNA’s declaration of purpose 
recites the story of Adam Walsh, Jacob Wetterling, Pam Lyncher, and Megan Kanka, to name a few.  42 U.S.C. 
16901 § 102 (2006).  
52 Legislative History, SMART, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/legislation.htm (last visited May 9, 2012).  
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 United States v. Reynolds, 132 S.Ct. 975 (2012).    
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to the Third Circuit to determine if the rule promulgated to this effect by the Attorney General in 
2007 is valid.56  Therefore, since federal Ex Post Facto challenges only look to the face of the 
statute, SORNA does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause even though it may continue to be 
applied retroactively according to the Attorney General’s rule.  However, as most if not all state 
laws promulgated under SORNA are retroactive on their face, this does not alleviate concerns 
about the changing Ex Post Facto analysis, or retroactive state laws promulgated under SORNA.    
 The Attorney General has stressed that the SORNA requirements are meant to be a floor, 
not a ceiling.  Most states employ additional restrictions and publish more information on their 
websites than required.  For example, in Michigan you can search the sex offender registry by 
first name, last name, estimated age, zip code, city, or county, or search for offenders within a 
certain radius.57  Examples of additional restrictions include residency and working restrictions 
on convicted offenders.  Recently, New York has banned convicted offenders from Internet gam-
ing sites.  Restrictions such as these are present in most states.  Many states also publish the in-
formation by handing out flyers in neighborhoods where sex offenders are locating after leaving 
prison or jail, and many state websites contain a quick print button, where site visitors can print a 
“mugshot” and fact sheet on any offender.  Many states now also publish information concerning 
any email addresses or online user names a convicted sex offender may use or plan to use.  Most, 
if not all state and federal laws are applied retrospectively, including SORNA, and offenders who 
committed crimes before enactment of these laws are nevertheless required to register and have 
information published online.   
 The stories of Adam Walsh and Jacob Wetterling, along with others mentioned, are no 
doubt terrible tragedies.  These laws are a response to the extremely negative feelings people 
                                                
56 Id.  
57  Michigan Public Sex Offender Registry, MICHIGAN STATE POLICE WEBSITE, 
http://www.mipsor.state.mi.us/PSOR_Search.aspx (last visited May 9, 2012).   
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have about these terrible sex crimes and their perpetrators, and this paper in no way suggests that 
negative feelings are not warranted in response to such actions.  However, traditionally, the Ex 
Post Facto Clause was utilized to protect persons who may become subject to overreaching retro-
spective state action because of “feelings of the moment.”58     
II.  ANALYSIS: SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES AND THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE 
 As previously stated, almost every circuit and the Supreme Court have found that sex of-
fender registration laws do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.  However, this section con-
cludes that the Court made an unannounced shift in Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence with the-
se decisions, one that allows states and the federal government to enact ‘civil’ schemes impossi-
ble to overcome with the “clearest proof.”   This shift came in three areas: 1) the Court moved 
away from the historical purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause 2) the “clearest proof” portion of 
the test has become almost insurmountable and 3) inaction may now suffice for a continuing 
criminal act, thereby allowing states and the federal government to legislate retrospectively.     
A.   Movement Away from the Historical Purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause 
 While never a portion of the Ex Post Facto “test,” the recitation of these historical pur-
poses traditionally set forth the foundation or structure for the Court’s analysis.  Therefore, the 
historical purposes were important in framing the Court’s thinking about the Ex Post Facto 
Clause, and would provide an important reference point in discussing the outcome of various 
factors.   
 There have been many Ex Post Facto Clause challenges to state sex offender registries, 
retrospective changes to laws regarding sex offenses, and SORNA, most of which have been un-
successful.   The following sub sections will discuss several Supreme Court and appellate court 
cases dealing with sex offender laws and the Ex Post Facto Clause.   
                                                
58 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810). 
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1.  Smith v. Doe59 & Stogner v. California:60 Same Court, Different Outcomes 
 In 2003 the Court ruled on two cases concerning sex offender laws and the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.  The juxtaposition of these cases demonstrates a tension in the Court and highlights the 
difference in the Ex Post Facto analysis absent the historical factors.  It is also revealing to look 
at the members of the majority and minority when analyzing these holdings and predicting future 
Court decisions.  Finally, it is important to remember that the Ex Post Facto Clause only prevents 
retroactive laws that are criminal in nature.  The point, however, is that several provisions in cur-
rent sex offender registration laws cross the line from civil to criminal and thus their retroactive 
application is violative of the Clause.  This becomes especially clear in light of the vindictive 
purpose and animosity behind the laws.   
a.  Smith v. Doe 
 In Smith v. Doe sex offenders convicted prior to the passage of the Alaska Sex Offender 
Registration Act (ASORA) challenged the act under § 1983 as a violation of the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.61  ASORA is very similar to SORNA and other state laws in that it requires an offender 
to report his or her “name, aliases, identifying features, address, place of employment, date of 
birth, conviction information, driver's license number, information about vehicles to which he 
has access, and postconviction treatment history.”62  Much of the information is public, including 
“the sex offender's or child kidnapper's name, aliases, address, photograph, physical description, 
description[,] license [and] identification numbers of motor vehicles, place of employment, date 
of birth, crime for which convicted, date of conviction, place and court of conviction, length and 
conditions of sentence, and a statement as to whether the offender or kidnapper is in compliance 
                                                
59 Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).   
60 Id.  
61 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003).   
62 Smith, 538 U.S. at 90.    See also ALASKA STAT §§ 12.63.010(b)(1) (2000). 
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with [the update] requirements . . . or cannot be located.”63 While ASORA did not specify the 
means by which the registry information was to be shared with the public, Alaska, like all states 
today, chose to make the information available on the Internet.64   
 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that ASORA did not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.65   The Court made no mention of the historical aim of protecting unpopular groups an-
ywhere in the opinion, but instead began its analysis by stating the aforementioned Ex Post Facto 
tests.  In the Court’s analysis, it found that 1) the legislature intended ASORA to be non-punitive 
and that none of the seven factors articulated in Martinez-Mendoza were in favor of finding the 
law punitive in nature, in other words, the respondents failed to show that ASORA’s effect was 
punitive by the “clearest proof.”66    
 First, the Court found that sex-offender laws are of recent origin, suggesting they are not 
punitive in nature, or at least not traditionally punitive.67  Respondents argued that ASORA was 
analogous to public shaming laws, which are punitive in nature.  The Court agreed that the Re-
spondents may suffer social ostracism but concluded, “[i]n contrast to the colonial shaming pun-
ishments . . . the State does not make the publicity and the resulting stigma an integral part of the 
objective of the regulatory scheme.”68 Despite the Courts conclusions, this is not automatically 
clear considering the language used on the ASORA website and on state websites today.  Placing 
a convicted offender’s name, address, car, and place of employment under a sometimes flashing 
heading of “Convicted Sex Offender” does seem to suggest shaming is integral to the legislative 
                                                
63 § 18.65.087(b). See also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).  
64 Smith, 538 U.S. at 91.   
65 Id. at 97.   
66 The Court limited the scope of its inquiry to five of the seven factors stating, “[t]he factors most relevant 
to our analysis are whether, in its necessary operation, the regulatory scheme: has been regarded in our history and 
traditions as a punishment; imposes an affirmative disability or restraint; promotes the traditional aims of 
punishment; has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose; or is excessive with respect to this purpose.” Id.  
67 Id. at 98.   
68 Id.  
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scheme.  Additionally, on the aforementioned websites, states do not list the offender’s crime 
with any detail.  Thus, the websites are not tools the public can use for making educated deci-
sions about the dangerousness of any one individual, but a place to see which of their neighbors 
was once convicted of a sex crime.  This is very similar to public shaming, and thus a criminal 
punishment.  
  It also seems that the Court was focused on the stated purpose of the law, not the effect 
of the law when it made this determination.  Traditionally, the seven Martinez-Mendoza factors 
were supposed to be used to determine the purpose of the law, and this was aided by framing the 
factors within the twin historical aims of the Clause.  However, as the Court’s analysis was done 
without this context, the outcome of the factors was determined by the law’s stated purpose.    
 Next, the Court found that ASORA did not create any affirmative disability or restraint 
on offenders.69  This, the Court stated, was because offenders were not required to register in 
person by the language of the Act (although the state had interpreted it in this way), and because 
any employment or housing troubles could not be proven as a result of the act, because the crim-
inal conviction was already public record.70   
 In this way, ASORA was different than most state laws promulgated under SORNA, 
which now contain several express restraints on sex offenders including living, working, and loi-
tering, and require reporting in person.  This is also an excellent example of how the purpose of 
the Clause—protecting unpopular individuals from vindictive legislation—can guide the Court 
where the laws stated purpose is “civil” but the effect is “criminal.”  There is no data showing 
                                                
69 It is important to note that many, if not all, states do now impose living, working, and social restraints on 
sex offenders.  These often include requiring sex offenders to live a certain distance from any place children would 
gather, requiring that sex offenders not be allowed to work with children, and making it a crime for a sex offender to 
“loiter” in a school zone.  It is unclear how the Court would view these restrictions.  SORNA does not contain any 
requirements for residential or working restrictions, although after the comment period the Attorney General 
stressed that SORNA is intended to be a “floor not a ceiling” for state sex offender registry laws.  Legislative 
History, SMART, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/legislation.htm (last visited May 9, 2012).  
70 Smith, 538 U.S. at 91.   
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that such restrictions on reporting, living, or working actually serve the legitimate state regulato-
ry goal of protecting the public.  In fact, often times this can create a more dangerous situation, 
where portions of cities, due to living restrictions, contain a dense population of prior offenders.  
Looking at the outrage at the group as a whole, this has more to do with “not in my back yard” 
syndrome than with any legitimate state objective.  It is by considering the purpose of the Clause, 
and looking at the effects of the legislation, that it becomes clear that certain portions of these 
laws are criminal in nature and therefore violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.   
 Third, even the state conceded that the statute may deter future crimes, and thus the law 
served one of the traditional aims of punishment, and Respondents argued that this was a factor 
in favor of finding the law punitive.71  However, the Court stated that “[a]ny number of govern-
mental programs might deter crime without imposing punishment.”72    As for the fourth factor, 
the Court stated “[t]he Act's rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose is a ‘[m]ost significant’ 
factor in our determination that the statute's effects are not punitive.”  However, the Court 
seemed willing to accept any rational basis, including ones the court imagined may have been the 
driving force behind ASORA.73  The court did not require, as Respondents suggested, that the 
statute be more narrowly drawn to meet that purpose.74  Again, with the absence of the historical 
aim of protecting unpopular individuals from vindictive legislation, these factors could be deter-
mined with a great amount of subjectivity and a blind eye to the social emotions towards sex of-
fenders as a group in conjunction with the law’s criminal consequence.    
                                                
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 102.   
73 “Alaska could conclude that a conviction for a sex offense provides evidence of substantial risk of 
recidivism.” Id. at 103 (emphasis added).  
74 Id. at 104.  
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 Finally the Court found that ASORA was not excessive.75 Studies that showed persons 
may reoffend as late as twenty years following release justified lifetime reporting requirements.76  
However, if a person was convicted at eighteen, they may be on the registry for some fifty, sixty, 
or seventy years.  This does not suggest why it would be reasonable for a person to report for 
such a long time, and would likely be considered had the Court included the historical frame-
work of protecting unpopular individuals in its analysis.77  The excessiveness, therefore, shows 
that the law was motivated at least in part by a desire to punish.  Keeping offenders on the regis-
tries longer than necessary 1) burns up the states valuable law enforcement resources and drains 
funds through administrative expenses and 2) unduly harasses the offenders.  There is no legiti-
mate state purpose in keeping offenders on the registries forty or fifty years after the original of-
fense.  No studies support this state action.   
 Three Justices dissented and two concurred in the result.78  Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist, 
O'Connor and Scalia joined in the Court’s opinion. Thomas concurred and formed the fifth vote 
for the majority opinion. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas argued that Ex Post Facto analysis 
of a statute in limited to the face of the statute.79  Therefore, he argued, any reference to Internet 
registration or other provisions that were the result of the statutory interpretation was out of 
place.80  Alaska delegated many details of the law to state agencies, and only the face of the leg-
islation, not their interpretations, was subject to Ex Post Facto Analysis.  This, unfortunately, 
means that states, in order to avoid violating the Ex Post Facto Clause can delegate interpretation 
to state agencies, which are not considered even if punitive in effect.      
                                                
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 103.  
78 Id. at 106. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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 Justice Souter concurred in the result only, stating that, to him, this was a much closer 
case.81  He pointed out that ASORA does not specify whether it is civil or criminal in nature and 
portions of the statute are found in the penal law.82  He also mentioned the lost first factor, stat-
ing that while the regulatory purpose should be afforded weight, it would be “it would be naive 
to look no further, given pervasive attitudes toward sex offenders” since the “Ex Post Facto 
Clause was meant to prevent ‘arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation.’”83  What tipped the 
scale for Justice Souter, in a case where he saw the punitive factors as roughly equal to the civil 
factors, was the presumption of constitutionality afforded to state laws.  This paper will later dis-
cuss what will be termed the “Souter Approach.”  By looking at the twin historical aims of the 
Ex Post Facto Clause, it is quite likely that many state laws promulgated under SORNA would 
be unconstitutional using the Souter analysis.   
 The three dissenters, Justices Stevens, Ginsberg and Breyer each found that the punitive 
effect of the law outweighed any civil purpose.   
b.   Stogner v. California84 
   In 1993, California enacted a criminal statute permitting prosecution for sex-related child 
abuse where the prior limitations period had expired if the new prosecution began within one 
year of a victim’s report to police. In 1998, Stogner was indicted for sex-related child abuse 
committed between 1955 and 1973. At the time those crimes were allegedly committed, the limi-
tations period was three years. Stogner argued that the new law violated the Ex Post Facto 
                                                
81 Id. at 107-08 
82 “The Act does not expressly designate the requirements imposed as ‘civil,’ a fact that itself makes this 
different from our past cases, which have relied heavily on the legislature's stated label in finding a civil intent. Id. 
83 Id. at 108-09 (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29).  Justice Souter also found that the statute imposed a 
substantial burden. “While the Court accepts the State's explanation that the Act simply makes public information 
available in a new way, the scheme does much more. Its point, after all, is to send a message that probably would 
not otherwise be heard, by selecting some conviction information out of its corpus of penal records and broadcasting 
it with a warning. Selection makes a statement, one that affects common reputation and sometimes carries harsher 
consequences, such as exclusion from jobs or housing, harassment, and physical harm.” Id. at 109.   
84 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003). 
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Clause, as it forbids revival of a previously time-barred prosecution.  The Supreme Court 
agreed.85 
 In contrast to Smith, in Stogner the Court began its analysis with an elongated explana-
tion of the twin historical aims of the Ex Post Facto Clause.  The Court stated, “[f]irst, the new 
statute threatens the kinds of harm that, in this Court’s view, the Ex Post Facto Clause seeks to 
avoid. Long ago Justice Chase pointed out that the Clause protects liberty by preventing gov-
ernments from enacting statutes with ‘manifestly unjust and oppressive’ retroactive effects.”86  
The Court continued, “a Constitution that permits such an extension, by allowing legislatures to 
pick and choose when to act retroactively, risks both ‘arbitrary and potentially vindictive legisla-
tion,’ and erosion of the separation of powers” and also the potential for “‘violent acts which 
might grow out of the feelings of the moment.’”87   
 To be certain, Stogner differs from Smith in that it deals with an expressly criminal provi-
sion, not a law that is arguably civil in nature.  However, this distinction should only change the 
application of the law, as in what test to apply, not the foundation or framework in which to ap-
ply the test.   Nevertheless, as these two cases show, when analyzing sex offender registry legis-
lation the Court omits this portion of the analysis.   
 It is also important to note that Justice Kennedy dissented and filed opinion in which 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas joined.  These are the same members of 
the Court that helped to form the majority opinion in Smith.  In their dissent, stated of the foun-
dational factors, “‘[w]hile the principle of unfairness helps explain and shape the Clause’s scope, 
it is not a doctrine unto itself, invalidating laws under the Ex Post Facto Clause by its own 
                                                
85 Id.  
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
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force.’”88 Overall, the majority of the Court did not disagree on this point.  However, when com-
pared to Smith’s majority and dissent, it is clear that the majority in Stogner did use the historical 
purpose of the Clause as a lens by which to discern the purpose and effect of legislation, even 
when a state claims to the contrary.   
2.  Analysis in a Vacuum: Following Smith and Stogner  
 It is interesting, in dealing with an Ex Post Facto challenge to legislation that targets a 
very unpopular group, the Court would abandon even the recitation of the first historical factor.  
These factors were mentioned in Respondent’s Brief and in Amicus Briefs in support of the Re-
spondent, as well as in Stogner during the same term; therefore, it was not that the Court was un-
aware of their prior significance.89  
 It could be argued that the Court would reach the same conclusion regardless of lip ser-
vice given to the historical factors.  In many of the cases where the historical factors were recited, 
the Court nevertheless found that the law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.  They are cer-
tainly not dispositive, but do create a frame for application of the factors and tests.  Additionally, 
protecting public safety is a legitimate state regulatory goal.  Requiring registration of convicted 
offenders who pose a danger to the public is well within the states power.  However, state laws 
under SORNA go much further than that. 
 With no overall purpose or history to consider, it is easy to see how a multifactor test, 
where a rational relationship to a legitimate state goal is the most important factor, could be 
skewed to suit any popular cause of the day.90  For example, consider the most important factor, 
                                                
88 Id. at 637.  quoting Carmell, at 533, n. 23, 120 S.Ct. 1620.    
89 They were also mentioned in Justice Souter’s concurring opinion.   
90 The factors include: Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has 
historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its 
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which 
it applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for 
it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.90 
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whether the regulation serves an alternative legitimate regulatory purpose.  When considered on-
ly in light of the assumed state purpose of protecting citizens against prior sex offenders, it may 
be unclear whether residency restrictions or posting information electronically is necessarily pu-
nitive.  However, as Justice Souter stated in his concurrence, “[e]nsuring public safety is, of 
course, a fundamental regulatory goal, and this objective should be given serious weight in the 
analyses. But, at the same time, it would be naive to look no further, given pervasive attitudes 
toward sex offenders.”  The historical goal of protecting individuals from the effects of public 
whims of the day would bring this factor into sharper focus and force the Court to look outside of 
the text of the legislation in order to discern its true purpose and effect.   
 For another example, consider the seventh Martinez-Mendoza factor, whether the legisla-
tion seems excessive in relation to the goal.  Absent any historical context, it may seem reasona-
ble not to require narrow tailoring in excess of statutory requirements, after all, SORNA and sub-
sequent sex offender registries require a conviction of a sex offense before placing someone on 
the list.  In Smith v. Doe the Court came to a similar conclusion.  However, mindful of the histor-
ic purpose of the Ex Post Facto Clause and public outrage against sex offenders, it may seem 
more vindictive to require lifetime registration or listing on a public registry under the title of 
‘Convicted Sex Offender.’  
 This is especially so when considering the extent of state laws promulgated under SOR-
NA.    For example, wide breadths of offenders are caught up in the laws.  Even offenders who 
are verified by doctors or specialists as no longer being a danger are not removed, nor can they 
petition for removal.  This is not in line with a regulatory scheme that has a singular goal of pro-
tecting the public.  If experts testify that certain individuals are no longer dangerous, there is no 
public good in keeping them on the list.  Additionally, as previously mentioned, there is a lack of 
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evidence that residency or working restrictions contained in most legislation promulgated under 
SORNA actually does anything to help recidivism rates or public safety— in fact these very re-
strictions can create dangerous situations where prior offenders are clumped together.  This was 
particularly so in Miami Dade County.  There living restrictions were such that over eighty sex 
offenders were forced to live under a bridge for a period of time because there was no place in 
the county where they could legally live under the sex offender laws.91  Furthermore, sex offend-
ers are faced with lifetime reporting restrictions analogous to probation or parole.  Finally, as 
mentioned above, the similarity between the websites and public shaming, which was punitive, 
should not be overlooked.   
 The aforementioned facts in conjunction with the documented punitive effects of the 
law—ostracism, evictions, harassment, violence, intrusiveness, and restricted movement—
strongly suggest something more than “civil regulation” is going on.92  As Justice Souter stated 
in his Smith concurrence,  
While the Court accepts the State's explanation that the Act simply makes 
public information available in a new way, the scheme does much more. 
Its point, after all, is to send a message that probably would not otherwise 
be heard, by selecting some conviction information out of its corpus of 
penal records and broadcasting it with a warning. Selection makes a 
statement, one that affects common reputation and sometimes carries 
harsher consequences, such as exclusion from jobs or housing, harassment, 
and physical harm.93  
    
The historical aim of the Clause draws attention to these results.   
                                                
91  Greg Allen, Sex Offenders Forced to Live Under Bridge, NPR (May 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104150499.  
92  Unjust and Ineffective, ECONOMIST, Aug. 6, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/14164614. 
93 Smith, 538 U.S. at 109.  
   
 
 
26 
3.  Subsequent Appellate Court Decisions 
 Federal appellate court cases dealing with Ex Post Facto challenges to SORNA have been 
equally void of these factors.94  Many are simply conclusory in their analysis.  Consider, for ex-
ample United States v. Young, in which the Fifth Circuit stated, “[w]ith SORNA, Congress ex-
pressly sought to ‘establish[ ] a comprehensive national system for the registration of [sex] of-
fenders’ in order ‘to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children.’ This 
express language indicates that Congress sought to create a civil remedy. Therefore, Young must 
present the ‘clearest proof’ that either the purpose or the effect of the regulation is in fact so pu-
nitive as to negate its civil intent. This he cannot do.”95  The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. 
Dixon, dismissed the issue in a similar fashion stating, “Dixon does not, and in light of Smith v. 
                                                
94 The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 938 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. granted, 
judgment vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2860, 180 L. Ed. 2d 811 (U.S. 2011), did consider these factors, as stated below.  
However, this case was vacated.  “As we do so, we are aware both of the Supreme Court's decision in Doe, and of 
the inflamed public sentiment against sex offenders that served as the historical backdrop for SORNA's passage. 
Justice Souter, concurring in Doe, saw the question of Alaska's legislative intent as a close one. He explained: It 
would be naive to look no further [than to the regulatory goal of public safety], given pervasive attitudes toward sex 
offenders. The fact that the Act uses past crime as the touchstone, probably sweeping in a significant number of 
people who pose no real threat to the community, serves to feed suspicion that something more than regulation of 
safety is going on; when a legislature uses prior convictions to impose burdens that outpace the law's stated civil 
aims, there is room for serious argument that the ulterior purpose is to revisit past crimes, not prevent future ones. 
SORNA's legislative history suggests that precisely such a retributive aim contributed to its passage—and more 
overtly than in the “close case” of Doe. Unlike Alaska's statute, which contained no legislative purpose statement 
and was passed pursuant to legislative findings that focused solely on public safety, SORNA's legislative purpose 
statement reveals an additional goal: to respond to the heinous crimes committed by sex offenders. SORNA was 
enacted “[i]n order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response to the 
vicious attacks by violent predators against the victims listed below ....” The statute subsequently lists seventeen 
individual victims and details the crimes that were committed against them, strongly suggesting that the motivation 
behind SORNA's passage was not only to protect public safety in the future but also to “revisit past crimes.” Senator 
Grassley's floor statement similarly reflects a retributive sentiment that colored the legislative proceedings: “Child 
sex offenders are the most heinous of all criminals. I can honestly tell you that I would just as soon lock up all the 
child molesters and child pornography makers and murderers in this country and throw away the key.”  The purpose 
of the Ex Post Facto Clause is to prevent the passage of “potentially vindictive legislation.”  SORNA's legislative 
text and history contain substantial warning signs that its aim, while principally regulatory, to be sure, is also in 
some measure punitive.” Id.   
95 United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 204-05 (5th Cir. 2009).   
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Doe, could not successfully, challenge the registration requirement itself as an Ex Post Facto 
law. The requirement is regulatory rather than punitive.”96  
 It is probable that the attorneys in these cases, who raised several issues on appeal, did 
not carefully craft or focus on their Ex Post Facto analysis, and the Fifth Circuit stated as much 
in Young.97    As SORNA, and post SORNA state legislation, contains additional requirements 
not present in ASORA, such as the requirement that individuals report in person to update the 
registry, it is not automatically clear that the analysis would or should be the same.  It is also 
possible that these courts saw the “clearest proof” as an impossible burden to overcome in light 
of Smith v. Doe.    
4.  A High Burden To Bear: Showing “Clearest Proof” 
 In light of the recent trend of cases increasing the “clearest proof” burden when consider-
ing whether legislation that is expressly or implicitly civil has a punitive effect, it is unclear what 
a defendant would have to show in order to reach this burden.  Initially case history suggested 
that the Court intended a lighter touch when applying the “clearest proof” standard.  However, 
after Smith v. Doe, appellate courts have treated a legislative statement of a civil purpose as dis-
positive.  The Supreme Court has not taken up this issue since Smith, so it is unclear whether or 
not new state laws promulgated under SORNA would meet this burden.     
B.  Inaction as Continuing Criminal Action 
 As at least one scholar has already pointed out, the Seventh Circuit along with a dissent 
in Carr v. United States may have announced an expansion of what it means to commit a contin-
uing offense.98  This would have the effect of taking failure to register according to laws such as 
                                                
96 United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 2008) rev'd and remanded sub nom. Carr v. United 
States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1152 (U.S. 2010).   
97 United States v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 204-05 (5th Cir. 2009).   
98  Corey Rayburn Yung, The Disappearing Ex Post Facto Clause: From Substantive Bulwark to 
Procedural Nuisance, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 447, 451 (2011).  
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SORNA out of the realm of the Ex Post Facto Clause by labeling it as a continuing offense.  
While it is not clear that this will be expanded or picked up by other circuits or by a majority of 
the Supreme Court, it would greatly change the analysis.  This is discussed briefly below.   
1.  Carr v. United States99  
 In Carr v. United States, the Court held that both interstate travel and failure to register 
must happen after the imposition of SORNA.100  This was the argument set forth by Carr, and 
therefore the Court did not reach the merits of whether SORNA violated the Ex Post Facto 
Clause.101  However, the Seventh Circuit treatment of the Ex Post Facto Clause, as affirmed by 
the dissent, warrants review.   
 Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit panel, rejected defendant’s claim that the 
Ex Post Facto Clause was violated when he was prosecuted for failure to register.102 Judge Pos-
ner asserted what amounts to a new rule stating, “as long as at least one of the acts took place 
[after the enactment of the statute], the clause does not apply.”103 Thus, the Court found that even 
though  “elements of [the defendant's] crime occurred before the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act was made applicable to him [that] does not make the application of the Act to 
his failure to register violate the Ex Post Facto clause.”104  Therefore, the Seventh Circuit held 
                                                
99 Carr v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2229 (2010).   
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
102 United States v. Dixon (Carr I), 551 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2008), rev'd and remanded, 130 S. Ct. 2229 
(2010).  Carr’s case was consolidated with another similar case on Appeal.   
103 Id. at 584-85.  The Court made this statement when discussing Dixon’s case, but since SORNA as 
applied to Dixon was found to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, it is clear that the court was addressing Carr at this 
point.  See also Corey Rayburn Yung, The Disappearing Ex Post Facto Clause: From Substantive Bulwark to 
Procedural Nuisance, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 447, 456 (2011) for a more expansive treatment of this case.   
104 Id. at 585;  See also Corey Rayburn Yung, The Disappearing Ex Post Facto Clause: From Substantive 
Bulwark to Procedural Nuisance, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 447, 451 (2011).  
   
 
 
29 
that the failure to act by not registering was a “continuing act with a continuing duty that consti-
tuted a new act after SORNA went into effect.”105 
  The new analysis does seem to make some sense in the absence of prior Court treatment, 
but “such an idea is strongly at odds with decades of case law regarding ongoing offenses. In its 
opinion, the Seventh Circuit cited two cases for the proposition that failure to register is [a] con-
tinuing offense.”  However, 
[b]oth were cases dealing with criminal conspiracies involving organized 
crime. The rationale for the charges to be construed in such cases as con-
tinuing is tied to the nature of conspiracies. . . . This is in sharp contrast to 
SORNA cases where the act charged is only an omission with a corre-
sponding duty that might predate the enactment of the statute by over a 
decade. In the SORNA cases, a defendant is de facto a criminal the mo-
ment the law goes into effect (or some reasonable period of time after-
wards). There is no need for the defendant to do anything else in order to 
be prosecuted for failure to register.106  
  
 Accepting this theory, it would be acceptable for states or the federal government to place 
future restrictions on anyone who was previously convicted of an offense.  No matter how puni-
tive the restriction may be, it would not run afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause because failure to 
follow the new restriction would constitute an continuing offense.  As an extreme example, con-
sider a state law requiring reporting whenever a person previously convicted of drunk driving 
was to get into their car.  The failure to report would be a continuing offense, and not subject to 
any Ex Post Facto challenge.  
                                                
105  Corey Rayburn Yung, The Disappearing Ex Post Facto Clause: From Substantive Bulwark to 
Procedural Nuisance, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 447, 451 (2011).  
106 Id.  Rayburn also noted that, “Moreover, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Toussie, stated clearly 
that “[continuing] offenses are not to be implied except in limited circumstances.” Further, the Court instructed 
lower courts that they should not identify an element of a crime as being continuing “unless the explicit language of 
the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress 
must assuredly have intended that it be treated as a continuing one.” Neither the Seventh Circuit nor district court in 
Husted cited any legislative support or special circumstances for a finding that the crime of failure to register in 
SORNA included a continuing offense element.” Id. at 452.   
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III.  LOOKING AHEAD: REACTION TO THE COURTS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 
 There are at least two potential consequences to the Courts analysis in Smith v. Doe and 
the “new” Ex Post Facto Analysis.   First, in order to avoid a serious Ex Post Facto challenge, 
many states have and will likely continue to label retroactive laws, specifically sex offender laws, 
as ‘civil’ in order to escape a stricter analysis by the courts.  Second, states or the federal gov-
ernment may choose to expand the logic of SORNA to several different areas, some of which 
have already been suggested by advocacy groups or legal scholars.   
A.   Be ‘Civil’: Avoiding Ex Post Facto Challenge  
 Even prior to the Ex Post Facto Clause challenges to sex offender registries in the past 
decade, it was easier for a civil regulatory law to withstand a challenge than for a criminal provi-
sion.  As stated previously, the court “must initially ascertain whether the legislature meant the 
statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.”107  If the court determines that the legislature wanted the 
statute to carry a criminal label, then they need not continue any further and all applicable Con-
stitutional protections apply.  If, however, the court finds that the legislature intended the regula-
tion to be civil it must then determine whether “the statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in 
purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention” to deem it “civil.”108 In order to make this 
determination, the court uses the aforementioned multi-factor Martinez-Mendoza test.  There-
fore, the legislatures intent, express or implied, that the law have a civil regulatory effect was 
always given deference.  However, in the wake of Smith v. Doe and several appellate court deci-
sions, giving sex offender laws a civil label creates a sort of immunity to an Ex Post Facto Chal-
lenge at the federal level. 
                                                
107 Id. at 361.  
108 Id.  See also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980). 
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 This is because of the very high “clearest proof” requirement.  Even with the difference 
between SORNA and ASORA, most federal courts dismissed any Ex Post Facto challenge to 
SORNA summarily, stating that defendants cannot overcome the burden since SORNA is a civil 
regulatory scheme.  The message to legislators, therefore, is that as long as any law is expressly 
labeled ‘civil,’ defendants will have a huge hill to climb to show that retroactive application vio-
lates the Ex Post Facto clause, regardless of any punitive purpose or effects the legislation may 
have.  For example, in Smith v. Doe, several of the factors were recognized as having some pos-
sible punitive effect, yet the court found that no factor cut in favor of creating “clearest proof.” 
Because of this high burden, perceived legislative intent is almost controlling.  It could be as-
sumed, and has by almost every federal circuit, that after Smith v. Doe even very restrictive laws 
with a civil legislative intent will not have the necessary punitive purpose or effect to the level of 
“clearest proof.”  
 This is made easier by the willingness of the courts to assume a completely civil role for 
the law even where legislative intent is questionable.  For example, in its preamble SORNA 
states it was enacted “[i]n order to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against 
children.”109  This creates a civil purpose.  However, the preamble continues that it was enacted  
“in response to the vicious attacks by violent predators against the victims listed below . . . .”110 
The statute then goes on to list seventeen victims of sex crimes and “details the crimes commit-
ted against them.”111   Therefore, while there is a discernable civil objective, as the Ninth Circuit 
pointed out, it also seems that the legislation contains a vindictive component, or a desire to pun-
                                                
109 42 U.S.C. § 16901. 
110 Id.  
111 United States v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 938 (9th Cir. 2010) cert. granted, judgment vacated, 131 
S. Ct. 2860 (2011).   
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ish those who have caused similar harm.  Justice Souter and the three dissenting Justices in Smith 
v. Doe came to a similar conclusion about ASORA.   
 With a blueprint to avoid challenge, complying with the federal Ex Post Facto Clause has 
become little more than a procedural checkmark when drafting legislation.  As long as the legis-
lation contains a discernable civil regulatory purpose, retroactive application will not run afoul of 
the Ex Post Facto Clause.   
B.   Expanding ‘Civil’ Regulatory Schemes 
 Public pressure for stricter regulation, in conjunction with the relative success of sex of-
fender registries in the courts, may create future incentive to expand civil regulatory schemes to 
the next unpopular group.  Law enforcement’s ability to keep and track these databases online 
makes such regulation more affordable and current data suggest states have already expand reg-
istration laws in some circumstances. 
 For example, in response to increasing methamphetamine use and distribution, at least 
four states created registries for those convicted of its use and sale.112  These laws are mirrors of 
sex offender registries, and are meant to serve the same purpose—to protect the public from po-
tentially dangerous individuals.  However, unlike many sex offenses, possession of methamphet-
amine is a nonviolent crime.  At least one scholar previously made this distinction and, although 
protesting that such registries create numerous concerns, including creating a class of individuals 
who are virtually unemployable and homeless, stated that “any Ex Post Facto claims against reg-
istries will likely fail” as a result of Smith v. Doe.113   
                                                
112 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15971396/#.T4wKmhwv3Ek 
113 Brian A. Loendorf, Methamphetamine Offender Registries: Are the Rights of Non-Dangerous Offenders 
Cooked?, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Spring 2008, at 542, 551.   
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 In Maine, a representative has proposed creating a registry for those convicted of drunk 
driving offenses.114  At lease one scholar has advocated this approach, suggesting that instead of 
restrictions on living and working areas, drunk drivers should be required to have special license 
plates placed on their cars to warn those driving around them.115  However, Senator Bill Dia-
mond of Maine, while he supporting sex offender registries because of the nature of the crime, 
asked, “If we do this, where will we stop?”116  “There are several issues that go with putting 
somebody’s picture up on a website — serious issues, many, many issues that the legislature 
needs to explore before passing something like this.”117 
 While the creation of any such new nation wide registry requirement is far from certain, 
allowing sweeping, strict, invasive, and retroactive sex offender registries has opened up the 
floodgate. While U.S. census data varies, in 2006 alone an estimated 1,205,273 individuals were 
convicted of felony offenses at the state and federal level.118  This does not include most drunk 
driving offenses, which are often misdemeanors.   The possibility that so many Americans could 
be subject to retroactive registration laws is concerning, considering myriad of difficulties con-
victed sex offenders have faced.   
 At this point, it is not clear that there is sufficient public support or funding for these ad-
ditional measures.  However, in looking at the recent Ex Post Facto challenges to sex offender 
registration legislation it is unlikely that the Clause would provide any protection to possible 
vindictive civil legislation already enacted or proposed.   
                                                
114 http://bangordailynews.com/2011/04/03/politics/drunken-driver-website-proposal-stirs-debate/ 
115 Michael J. Watson, Carnage on Our Nation's Highways: A Proposal for Applying the Statutory Scheme 
of Megan's Law to Drunk-Driving Legislation, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 459 (2008) 
116 http://bangordailynews.com/2011/04/03/politics/drunken-driver-website-proposal-stirs-debate/ 
117 Id.  
118 http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0343.pdf 
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IV.    POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
 This section will consider alternative solutions to overreaching state and federal legisla-
tion.  First, this portion will discuss potential remedies under the Ex Post Facto Clauses of state 
constitutions.  Second, this note suggests a middle ground, entitled the ‘Souter Approach’ for his 
concurrence in Smith v. Doe, where civil regulatory laws are examined in light of the twin histor-
ical aims.  Finally, although not a solution to the Ex Post Facto analysis issue, this note will dis-
cuss how some public pressures are working to pull back, or at least reconsider some of the 
country’s strictest laws.   
A.  Remedies Under State Constitutions 
 Although failing in federal courts, at least two ex post facto challenges to sex offender 
registry laws under the ex post facto clauses of state constitutions were successful.  In Wallace v. 
State, the Supreme Court of Indiana found that the states sex offender registry law could not be 
applied retroactively as it violated the states ex post facto clause.119   
 In Wallace, the court considered whether the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act 
(“Act”), which required “defendants convicted of sex and certain other offenses to register with 
local law enforcement agencies and to disclose detailed personal information, some of which is 
not otherwise public” constituted “retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause 
contained in the Indiana Constitution because it applies to a defendant who committed his of-
fense before the statutes were enacted.”120  Several post-SORNA amendments to the Act made it 
more invasive and restrictive than ASORA.  For example, a 2008 amendment required the dis-
closure of “any electronic mail address, instant messaging username, electronic chat room 
                                                
119 Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 373 (Ind. 2009).   
120 Id.  
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username, or social networking web site username that a sex offender uses or intends to use.”121 
It also required that the offender consent to searches of his or her computer at any time and agree 
to install software monitoring his or her internet use.  Furthermore, an offender was required to 
“at all times keep in his or her possession a valid driver's license or identification card,” and was 
subject to criminal charges for failure to do so.122  Finally, the latest version of the Act made it 
“an offense for sexually violent predators and certain subcategories of sex and violent offend-
ers . . . to live within one thousand feet of a school, youth program center, or public park, or liv-
ing within one mile of the residence of the victim of the offender's sex offense.”123 While these 
factors were absent in Smith v. Doe, they are common provisions of most sex offender registra-
tion laws today.   
 The court declined to assume that Indiana’s Ex Post Facto Clause was exactly analogous 
to the federal clause, but did apply the “intent-effects” test promulgated by the federal courts, 
including the seven Martinez-Mendoza factors.  Unlike the majority in Smith v. Doe, the court 
did not determine that the statute had a non-punitive intent, as it has several criminal provisions, 
and did not require Wallace to show that the statute was punitive in its effects by the “clearest 
proof.” Instead, the court carefully weighed each of the factors and ultimately determined that 
the statute, as applied retroactively to Wallace, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the state 
constitution.    
 Some differences in Wallace as compared to Smith v. Doe are as follows: As for the first 
factor, whether the sanction involved an affirmative disability or restraint, the court concluded 
that several provisions were very restrictive.  For example, it required an offender to update reg-
istration information within 72 hours or carry valid governmental identification at all times under 
                                                
121 IND. CODE § 11–8–8–8 (Supp. 2008). Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 375-76 (Ind. 2009).   
122 Id.  
123 Ind.Code § 35–42–4–11 (2006). See also Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 377. 
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threat of prosecution.  When analyzing the second factor, whether the sanction has traditionally 
been seen as a form of punishment, the court agreed with arguments put forth in Smith: 1) that 
public registries that list individuals as “sex offenders” are analogous to public shaming and 2) 
that the reporting requirements are analogous to probation and parole.   
 Perhaps the most important difference was with respect to what the court considered the 
most important factor.  In Wallace, the court found that the law did have a legitimate regulatory 
purpose, agreeing with the Court in Smith v. Doe.  However, in Wallace the court stated that this 
was not the most important factor.  The most important factor was number seven, whether the 
law was excessive in relation to that purpose.  As to the laws breadth the court stated, “[i]n this 
jurisdiction the Act makes information on all sex offenders available to the general public with-
out restriction and without regard to whether the individual poses any particular future risk.”124 
Therefore, the law was excessive in relation to the legitimate purpose.   
 This difference is important because how it changes the analysis.  The Supreme Court 
placing the most weight on the presence of a legitimate state purpose is analogous to requiring 
only rational basis review for an Ex Post Facto challenge of a ‘civil’ law.  In contrast, the Indiana 
Supreme Court, by placing more weight on whether the law is excessive in relation to the given 
purpose is equivalent to requiring intermediate scrutiny.  In this way, the Supreme Court gave 
many legislators free reign to legislate retroactively as long the regulation was ‘civil’ and there 
was a legitimate purpose. However, Indiana requires not only a legitimate purpose, but also a law 
tailored to reach that purpose and thus provides much greater protection.  Several other states, 
like Indiana, consider the seventh Martinez-Mendoza factor to be the most important and there-
                                                
124 Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) 
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fore review of retroactive sex offender registration laws under state constitutions could provide 
an alternative source of relief.125   
 The Maine Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in State v. Letalien,126 however 
other states have not chosen to follow this path.127 Some scholars argue that invalidating retroac-
tive application of state sex offender registry laws violates public policy and therefore states 
should adopt a balancing test to weigh the issue.128  It remains unclear what other states will 
chose to do.129 
B.  The Souter Approach 
 Justice Souter’s approach in Smith v. Doe was preferable to the majorities in two ways.  
First, it resurrected the traditional historical aim of protecting unpopular individuals from vindic-
tive legislation and used this as a foundation for the analysis.  Second, Justice Souter would not 
require the “clearest proof” of punitive effects or purpose where, as in many sex offender regis-
tration laws, the actual legislative intent is not clear.   
 This would leave room for states to legislate to protect the public, while protecting those 
with prior offenses from being wrapped up in more restrictive laws.  As Justice Souter found the 
Alaska statute in Smith to be a close call, this would likely mean that for him, most laws promul-
gated under SORNA would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if applied retroactively.   
C.  Indications of a Change in Public Opinion 
 There are also some examples, although far and few between, of public dissatisfaction 
with laws that go too far.  While these could serve to quell the continuing wave of retroactive sex 
                                                
125 Id.  
126 State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, 985 A.2d 4, 7.   
127 Conneticut, Texas for example.   
128 See, e.g., Lauren Wille, Maine's Sex Offender Registry and the Ex Post Facto Clause: An Examination 
of the Law Court's Unwillingness to Use Independent Constitutional Analysis in State v. Letalien, 63 ME. L. REV. 
367, 368 (2010) 
129 State v. Letalien, 2009 ME 130, 985 A.2d 4, 7. 
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offender laws, it remains the point that individuals are subject to public whims, whether positive 
or not, which is specifically what the framers intended the Ex Post Facto Clause to protect indi-
viduals against.   
1.  Current Examples 
 In 2010, sex offender laws in Miami Dade County were so restrictive in their residence 
requirements that the only place in the county that a convicted offender could reside was under a 
highway bridge.130  Several local and national news stations covered the story, which caused 
considerable public discontent.  At one point over eighty sex offenders were living under the 
bridge and used the bridge as their permanent address for purpose of the sex offender registries.  
This, arguably, created a much more dangerous situation than was present before the registration 
requirements.  Eventually the state was forced to enact more uniform legislation with much less 
restrictive residency requirements, thus allowing all of the offenders living under the bridge to 
find permanent residences within the county.   
2.  Predicting Future Behavior 
 Future public opinion could change in one of two ways.  First, as the sex offender regis-
tries continue to grow, often including several non-violent offenders, it is likely that more and 
more people will identify not only with the fear of a sexual assault but with a particular offender 
who is on the list.  People who once feared their sons and daughters would be assaulted may find 
their children subject to the same laws that they supported twenty years prior.  For example, sev-
eral stories of college age offenders who were caught with a few items of child pornography on 
their computers has lead some to question the effects of registration laws.  As these laws affect 
more individuals the attitude may change from “not-in-my-back-yard” to maybe we have gone 
                                                
130  Greg Allen, Sex Offenders Forced to Live Under Bridge, NPR (May 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104150499.  
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too far.  At the very least, this might encourage states to narrowly tailor their laws, targeting the 
most violent offenders or those most likely to reoffend, instead of grouping a large variety of sex 
offenses together under one scheme. Second, as budgets continue to shrink, keeping track of of-
fenders may become a substantial burden for local law enforcement agencies.      
CONCLUSION 
    While the goal of preventing vindictive legislation aimed at unpopular groups surfaced 
in the very first Ex Post Facto Clause case,131 most federal courts have abandoned it in the rash 
of recent cases testing the constitutionality of retroactive sex offender registry laws.  Increasing 
deference to laws with a ‘civil’ label combined with the absence of this foundational guiding 
principle has often made it impossible for advocates to show even the most severe SORNA-like 
legislation violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.   
 The court’s Ex Post Facto analysis of SORNA and subsequent state laws are flawed in 
two ways.   First, when court’s analyze sex offender registration laws under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause absent the historical aims, the multifactor test is essentially performed in a vacuum and 
becomes extremely subjective.   Second, the court’s increased deference to ‘civil’ regulatory 
laws has made it nearly impossible for advocates to show that a ‘civil’ law has a ‘criminal’ pur-
pose or effect.     
 There are solutions to quell this trend.  At least one state has found its version of SORNA 
to violate the Ex Post Facto clause of the state constitution.  Alternatively, Justice Souter’s con-
currence in Smith v. Doe could provide an alternative analytical framework.  No matter the solu-
tion, it is important 1) to recognize that the Court’s Ex Post Facto analysis has changed in regard 
to sex offender registration laws and 2) for the courts to reinsert the historical goal of protecting 
unpopular groups from vindictive legislation into its Ex Post Facto analysis.   
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